

Demographic Features

With 46.5 million inhabitants (as of 01/08/2007) Ukraine is Europe's 6th, and the world's 27th most populous country. During the 20th century the general trend of **population growth in Ukraine** was broken by the two world wars, the artificially engineered famine of 1932–33 and forced migration, which cumulatively resulted in a serious demographic loss estimated at around 12 million people. It was only in 1959 that the population number managed to recover to pre-war levels (*Table 8*). However, behind a general trend in population growth, following World War II there has long been a simultaneous trend showing a weakening increase, and net migration. For instance, during the first post-war census period (1959–70) there was 12.6% growth, followed by 5.6% during the second one (1970–79) and diminishing further (3.9%) in the third period (1979–89). The reduction in population growth from the 1960s was an international trend in Europe and the USSR (excluding Turkey and the Soviet republics with a Muslim cultural background), and arose from the narrower generation reproduction (*Figure 29*). In the 1990s an abrupt change in population dynamics occurred in Ukraine. After reaching an all-time maximum population number in 1993 (52.2 million), it dropped by 5.7 million between 1993 and 2007. Three-quarters of this loss is attributed to a natural population decrease and one-quarter as a result of the negative migratory balance. Relative to the figures in 1989, Ukraine lost 9.7% of its population. Similar losses could be observed in Romania (-7%) and Bulgaria (-12%), which were less catastrophic than the trends observed in Latvia, Estonia and Georgia (-16 – -20%). During the same period considerable population growth characterised – mainly due to mass immigration – the developed EU countries (5–10%), along




Table 8. Change in the population number on the present-day territory of Ukraine (1897–2007)

Year	1897	1913	1926	1939	1950	1959	1970	1979	1989	2001	2007
Population number (million persons)	28.4	35.2	37.8	40.5	37.3	41.9	47.1	49.6	51.5	48.2	46.5


Source: www.ukrstat.gov.ua


with Turkey and the post-Soviet Muslim states (due to the high crude birth rate) (20–40%).

Current demographic processes in Ukraine are characterised by highly unfavourable trends. Their analysis suggests that there is an early origin to this tendency. Already in the second half of the 1920s crude birth rates were showing decline within the rural population, by 1979 having turned into outright depopulation of these areas. This tendency has spread into the national statistics for Ukraine as a whole since 1991. Thus, worsening socio-economic conditions in the 1990s – when the positive effects of a previously favourable age-structure ceased to support population growth in most regions – were not the trigger; they only intensified negative demographic trends. Population growth between 1989–2001 could only be observed in some raions, due to natural population increase (e.g. in Hutzulschina, Bukovina and in some raions of Volhynian Polissia) and due to a positive migratory balance (e.g. as a result of the returning Tartarians in Crimea) (Figure 30). Since the census of 2001, the population of all regions of the country (excluding Kyiv City) is decreasing,


but to a different extent. While the western areas (Transcarpathia, Galicia and Volhynia) with a traditionally high fertility rate could almost maintain their 2001 population level (yearly -0.2 – -0.3% decrease), the central regions around Kyiv with a high mortality rate have experienced a yearly loss of 0.9 – 1.2% of their population.

This reduction in the population number since the census 2001 has mostly resulted from unfavourable developments in the natural rate of population change (Figure 31, Table 9). The first post-war fall in the crude *birth rate* started in the period 1950–1955, according with general European trends (Figure 32). Its level stabilised between 1965 and 1985 at around 15%, which is equal to a total *fertility rate* of about 2.0 (children per woman). During this period about 700,000 – 800,000 live births were registered yearly. It meant that the majority of pregnancies were unwanted, arising from neglecting to use contraceptive methods. From the middle of the 1980s onwards, the birth and fertility rate fell again, the decline of which was aggravated by worsening economic conditions and the decline in living standards of the population during the





1990s. The crude birth and total fertility rates reached their lowest level (7.7% and 1.1 children per woman) in 2001, after which, due to positive developments in the economy and society,



a moderate but continuous fertility increase started, culminating in a 9.7% birth rate in 2007. These days the highest crude birth rate level (11–13%) can be observed in the western territories (dominated by a more conservative population that is deeply motivated by issues of ethnicity and religion, in part by the Catholic Church), in Galicia, Transcarpathia and in Volhynia. Due to an expansion in contraceptive services and other factors, the annual number of abortions recently fell to a quarter of a million, which represents barely more than half of the rate for live births. According with the facts mentioned above, it is understandable that the ratio of abortions, that of unwanted pregnancies, and of births to unmarried couples is about four times higher in the more urbanised, secularised East (e.g. Donbas) than in the West (e.g. Galicia, Transcarpathia).

During the 1990s, falling birth rates were accompanied (in contrast to developed countries) with a decreasing average *life expectancy at birth*. According to WHO data, life expectancy is 10.9 years shorter in Ukraine than amongst the EU member states. This figure for women is 11 years longer than that of men (*Table 9*) and it is the longest in the western areas with the highest fertility rate, mentioned above (*Figure 33*).


The main cause of the present-day natural population decrease is that the crude *death rate* started to increase from the 1960s onwards. Since then, mortality has increased – similarly to Russia – from 8.2% to 17.2% (2007), which represents one of the highest figures in Europe (*Figure 34*). As in Russia following the Gorbachev anti-alcohol campaign (from 1985) the mortality ratio decreased, while after economic liberalisation in 1991 (resulting in widely available and cheaper alcohol) this ratio significantly increased. While an increase in the death rate has been recorded amongst all age groups, its level among working-age (especially 30–45 year old) men is the highest in Europe due to their worsening health and self-destructive lifestyle originating from increasing social stresses. The main causes of death in 2003 were connected with diseases of the circulatory system (59.7%) and cancer (12%). The crude death rate peaked at 19–23% in the hinterland-regions of Kyiv (e.g. Chernihiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy and Zhytomyr), which is a significant contrast to Kyiv City and the western areas with their high fertility rate (with the lowest crude death rate at 12–16%). The *infant mortality rate*, which decreased between the

Table 9. Selected demographic indicators of Ukraine (1990–2007)

Years	Crude birth rate	Crude death rate	Natural increase/decrease	Balance of internal migration	Registered			Ratio of population		Ageing index	Life expectancy at birth		
					Marriages	Divorces	Abortions	aged 0–14	aged 65 and over		Both sexes combined	Male	Female
per 1,000 inhabitants													
in %													
1990	12.6	12.1	0.5	1.5	9.3	3.7	19.7	21.4	12.3	57.5	69.3	64.2	74.2
1991	12.1	12.9	-0.8	2.9	9.5	3.9	18.4	21.2	12.6	59.6	68.7	63.5	73.7
1992	11.4	13.3	-1.9	5.6	7.6	4.3	17.9	21.0	12.9	61.4	68.0	62.8	73.1
1993	10.7	14.2	-3.5	1.1	8.2	4.2	16.5	20.8	13.3	63.9	67.2	61.8	72.7
1994	10.0	14.7	-4.7	-2.8	7.7	4.0	15.3	20.5	13.6	66.3	66.9	61.4	72.6
1995	9.6	15.4	-5.8	-2.6	8.4	3.8	14.3	20.1	13.8	68.9	67.4	61.9	72.9
1996	9.2	15.2	-6.0	-3.3	6.0	3.8	13.4	19.7	13.9	70.8	68.1	62.7	73.5
1997	8.7	14.9	-6.2	-2.7	6.8	3.7	11.7	19.2	14.0	73.0	68.3	62.9	73.7
1998	8.4	14.4	-6.0	-3.0	6.2	3.6	10.4	18.5	13.9	74.9	67.9	62.4	73.5
1999	7.8	14.9	-7.1	-2.8	6.9	3.5	9.9	17.8	13.8	77.4	68.3	62.8	74.1
2000	7.8	15.4	-7.6	-2.7	5.6	4.0	8.8	17.2	14.0	81.2	68.3	62.7	74.1
2001	7.7	15.3	-7.6	-3.1	6.4	3.7	7.6	16.5	14.5	87.8	68.2	62.6	74.1
2002	8.1	15.7	-7.6	-0.7	6.6	3.8	7.1	15.8	15.1	95.5	68.2	62.6	74.1
2003	8.5	16.0	-7.5	-0.5	7.8	3.7	6.6	15.8	15.0	95.0	68.0	62.2	74.0
2004	9.0	16.0	-7.0	-0.2	5.9	3.6	6.1	15.3	15.5	101.7	70.0	64.7	75.6
2005	9.0	16.6	-7.6	0.1	7.1	3.9		14.8	15.9	107.4			
2006	9.8	16.2	-6.4	0.3	7.6	3.8		14.5	16.2	111.9			
2007	9.7	17.2	-7.5	0.3	5.2	3.7							


Remark: 2007 (first half)

Source: www.ukrstat.gov.ua



early 1950s until today, from 85% to 10.7% represents an average between Hungary, Poland (at ca. 7%) and Romania, Russia (ca. 17%). This rate

is at its highest (13–14%) in the eastern, mostly industrialised areas (e.g. Donets'k, Luhans'k and Zaporizhzhia).





There is a close relationship between mortality patterns and the *health* state of the population, which was formed by the impact of medical-demographic circumstances of the 1950 and 60s, having left their imprint on the subsequent situation. In the 1980s over 15% of adults and more than 20% of children suffered from diseases. By the 1990s this turned into a medical-demographic crisis. The state of the healthcare system is deteriorating, the number of medical establishments is decreasing and due to the transition of treatment towards a pay-for-care system, the majority of the population has only limited access to healthcare (Shangina 2004). Indicators of this crisis are phenomena such as the growing rate of premature mortality and morbidity, a widespread distribution of chronic diseases, negative shifts in the dynamics and structure of disorders, the swift spread of specific new harms and diseases (AIDS, narcotics) and a re-emergence of those that were previously almost eradicated (tuberculosis and other epidemics).

In 1991, the balance of the crude birth and death rate turned, from a natural increase into a *natural decrease* in the population and has been stable in its ratio since 2001 at around 7.6% per year due to the parallel increase in fertility and mortality. The natural decrease is the lowest (1.2–3.7%) in the western regions, where the natural population increase was sustained the longest (e.g. Rivne until 1994, Ivano-Frankivsk until 1995 and Transcarpathia until 1998). As a result of the lowest fertility rate, paired with the highest mortality ratio the natural decrease reached a particularly alarming level (-11 – -16%) in the Donbas area and in the Left-Bank in Ukraine (e.g. Chernihiv, Sumy and Poltava oblasts) (Figure 35). Even in 2004 fertility exceeded mortality in the raions of Volhynian Polissia and Eastern Transcarpathia (Figure 36).

During the last century, the growth and structure of the population of Ukraine was heavily affected by migration. *Internal migration*, which has had a profound impact on the population density of regions, was rather intense in Ukraine during certain phases in its historical development. These were mainly periods of

resettlement involving huge portions of the rural population, to urban centres and industrial areas especially in the Donbas region, along the Dnipro river and in the coastal areas of the Black Sea. In the 1970s the annual average number of people settling in cities and towns amounted to 300 thousand, predominantly arriving from villages. In 1986, the evacuation and resettlement from the 30 km zone affected by the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant disaster represents a special case of internal migration. Within this belt, residents have left 71 rural and several urban settlements. The accident's survivors were mostly evacuated from Prypiat' to the new town, Slavutysh founded in 1986. Since the 1990s, the intensity of rural–urban migration has decreased and internal migration has lately been dominated by resettlement to Kyiv, the capital city; two thirds of migratory loss from oblasts is due to migration of this type. Recently (2006) only 3.08% of the population embarked on internal migration (between the regions). The most popular destinations for internal migrants are Kyiv (+8.9% migratory increase) and its region, in addition to the oblasts of Kharkiv, Crimea and





Dnipropetrovs'k (+0.4 – +1.4%). The main source regions of internal migrants moving to Kyiv are Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy and Kirovohrad (with -1.5 – -4.4% migratory losses in 2006).

External migration, crossing the present-day Ukrainian borders during the Soviet period until the 1950s, was characterised by the state-resettlement of people (mostly Russians) in order to form new workforces, along with the deportation of politically "unreliable" ethnic groups (e.g. Crimean Tartars, Germans and sometimes tens of thousands of Ukrainians). Later, migration (at that time internally within the Soviet Union) for employment reasons became voluntary and of an ad-hoc nature. Younger generations were recruited and moved to Russian Siberia and the Far East, at best returning as pensioners, which considerably altered the Ukrainian demographic structure. Following the collapse of the USSR (1991) people from the former Soviet states (along with the deported, later rehabilitated ethnic groups: e.g. Crimean Tartars and Germans) started to return to their homeland regions. Despite this "return-migration" having a notably Russian flavour, culminating in

1992 it was to serve as a migration surplus for Ukraine until 1993. Due to economic-political instability, the spread of unemployment, the hyperinflation of 1991–1993, the dramatic decrease in personal incomes and the exceptionally low price of labour in Ukraine, the emigration of Ukrainians dramatically increased and was not only in the direction of the post-Soviet space. Between 1994 and 2004, the population of Ukraine suffered an officially recorded migratory loss of 1.22 million persons. According to the estimations of Ukrainian embassies, 2–3.5 million Ukrainians are working abroad (most of them illegally): around one million in Russia, 300,000 in Poland, 200,000 each in Italy and the Czech Republic, 150,000 in Portugal and 100,000 in Spain. Besides the emigration of Ukrainians, there is also considerable outward migration amongst certain ethnic groups (e.g. Russians, Jews, Germans, Hungarians and Greeks). Since 2005, the balance of external migration into the country is again positive due to a moderate rise in the global appeal of Ukraine, which has resulted in a decrease in emigration and a slight increase in immigration (partly from Russia,


Moldova, Transcaucasia, and third-world countries). According to official statistics, the total volume of (internal and external) migration in the regions of Ukraine is decreasing since 1989 (Figure 37). These days, the least mobile are the populations of the western areas (Galicia, Transcarpathia), in contrast to the hinterland regions of Kyiv and Crimea.


The present-day distribution of the population in Ukraine is a product of social-economic development and, at particular times, of physical-climatic conditions and ethnic-historical traditions. The average **population density** has decreased in parallel with the total population of the country: in 1993, there were 87 persons per square km, whilst in 2001 this figure was 80, and in 2007, 77. Of the regions, Donetsk oblast has the highest value (172 pers./sq. km) and Chernihiv oblast has the lowest density (36 pers./sq. km). The least densely inhabited rural areas of the country (below 40 pers./sq. km) are the regions (primarily the Steppes) which were colonised the last (in the 17–19th centuries). At the same time the highest population density (above 80 pers./sq. km) can be ob-

served in the western areas (Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia), with settlement primarily on the plains and low hilly regions, in proximity to the Dnister, Prut and Tisa rivers (Figure 38).

The **sex and age structure** of the population as a demographic and economic phenomenon has an impact on the reproductive and labour potential of society. Following large losses amongst the male population during the wars, the ratio of *men to women* (taken for one thousand women) grew during the period 1959–1989 (1959: 797; 1989: 857 men/1,000 women). The figures witnessed a slowing-down in this improvement during the 1990s due to the extreme increase in mortality, decrease in fertility and the gradual ageing of the population (2001: 861; 2006: 860 men/1,000 women). These days the most balanced ratio between the sexes (890–930 men/1,000 women) is characteristic of the western areas (Transcarpathia, Galicia and Volhynia), whose demographic situation is the most favourable.

An *ageing* of the population and the increase in the ratio of elderly people is one of the most significant demographic phenomena in





Ukraine. The proportion of children aged 0–14 years decreased during the period 1950–2006 from 27.2% to 14.5%. At the same time the ratio of persons aged 60 and more increased from 10.9% to 20.6%, and of those aged 65 or more from 7.6% to 16.2%. There is a striking difference as to the extent of ageing between urban and rural areas. The proportion of population aged 60 years and over was 19.1% in the former and 26.1% in the latter at the time of the last census (2001). Due to general ageing of the population, the considerable increase in the death rate amongst working-age people (mainly amongst men) and the decrease in fertility, the present-day Ukrainian age pyramid is characterised by a widening of its upper section and sharp narrowing of its lower section. The most "healthy" age structure also encompasses the "youngest" regions by population: Transcarpathia, Rivne and Chernivtsi oblast due to their favourable demographic attributes mentioned above.

In Ukraine there are relatively stable traditions of **marriage and family life**; ca. 90% of citizens live in family units. Nevertheless, the social-economic and demographic crisis of the

1990s (with their triggers tracing back to the 1960s) has led to a rising postponement of marriage and birth of children, a growing rate of extra-marital births and social orphanage, and a high occurrence of divorce. Unmarried, cohabiting couples are becoming ever more frequent. As a consequence of the crisis in married and family life, there is a widespread phenomena of single-parent families (19.3% in urban settlements); a growing ratio of children born out of wedlock (mothers of 34.1% of children born to women younger than 20 years of age, are unmarried); and a massive spread of childless and single-child marriages (where two thirds of families with children under 18 years have only one child). These changes in the marital and family status of the population are a manifestation of the setting-up of a new type of population reproduction in the market environment (Kuras – Pirozhkov 2004). During the period between 1989 and 2001 the ratio of married persons aged 16 years and over decreased; in the case of men from 74.3% to 66.3%, whilst amongst women this fell from 60.6% to 55.2%. This marital status index is the lowest in the eastern

and southern regions (e.g. Kharkiv, Luhans'k, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia and Crimea), which played host to the main arenas of Socialist industrialisation and urbanisation, and were characterised by high social and territorial mobility, a high rate of marriages and divorces and hence, high marital instability. The stability of families and marriages is the highest in the more traditional western territories that are deeper motivated by issues of ethnicity and religion (e.g. Transcarpathia, Galicia, Bukovina and Volhynia). This fact is also manifested in the high demographic vitality of these regions.

The Ukrainian population traditionally has a high **level of education**. All censuses following the Second World War testify to its continuing improvement. Based on records for the first Soviet census after the Second World War (1959), the mean duration of schooling for persons aged 10 years and over was 5.05 years, having grown to 10.3 by 2001, the figure for which was one of the highest in the world (Table 10). Additionally, according to indicators of educational attainment for the population aged 15 years and over, Ukraine is ahead of not only the post-Communist states but of the majority of developed countries in the world. 34% of people older than 14 years possessed (complete, incomplete or basic) higher education at the time of the 2001 census. The same value in the USA's case was 48.1%, Russia 19.1%, Germany 16.1% or

Poland 10.2%. There is a specific feature amongst the educational statistics of Ukraine: women are educated to a higher level than men and this pattern can be identified in each age bracket up to 60 years old. Levels of education amongst the rural and urban population differ considerably. The ratio of those with higher education, for persons aged 10 and over, is more than twice as high amongst urban dwellers than within the rural population (37.9% and 17.7%, respectively). As a result, the highest levels of education are connected with the big cities and most urbanised areas in general: Kyiv, Sevastopol', Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Odesa, etc. (Figure 39). In contrast to these regions, the population of western Ukraine (first of all Transcarpathia, Bukovina and Volhynia) had the lowest educational attainment in the 2001 census.


Despite overall positive trends in macroeconomic indicator values in the Ukrainian economy between 1999 and 2006, **employment** (as the economic basis of social welfare) continued to shrink. Its expansion since 2006 can be attributed to the growth of self-employment. Although the rate of unemployment (measured by ILO methodology) had decreased by 33% between 2000 and 2006, it remained high (9.1%) even by the end of this period.

The Ukrainian labour market still faces severe issues, such as gender discrimination, youth unemployment and the lack of availabil-

Table 10. Educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over in Ukraine and in selected countries of the world

Country	Year	Highest education level attained			Average duration of schooling
		Post-Secondary level	Secondary level	Primary level	
		Percentage of the population aged 15 and over			
UKRAINE	2001	34.0	55.2	7.9	10.32
United States	2000	48.1	42.9	8.2	12.05
Japan	2000	22.2	50.1	27.5	9.47
United Kingdom	2000	19.6	41.7	35.4	9.42
Russian Federation	2002	19.1	57.3	21.5	10.03
France	2000	17.3	35.7	46.2	7.86
Germany	2000	16.1	61.4	18.6	10.20
Austria	2000	14.7	57.0	25.5	8.35
Hungary	2000	12.1	41.7	43.9	9.12
Poland	2000	10.2	53.7	34.1	9.84
Romania	2000	7.3	68.0	20.5	9.51
China	2000	2.8	45.3	33.9	6.35

Source: www.ukrcensus.gov.ua
<http://devdata.worldbank.org>



ity of jobs for people having completed higher education. The employment level for men was 60.3% and 52.6% among women, and average pay for females was 68.6% lower than for men.

During the first years of the 21st century, economically active people amounted to more than 22 million of the population aged between 15–70 years, and less than 21 million of those of working age, i.e. between 15–54 for females and 15–59 for males. This corresponds to rates of economic activity of 62% and 71%, respectively. The census of 2001 found the rate of economic activity to be 65.5%.

As is the case in most countries of the world, *economic activity* amongst males exceeds that of females in Ukraine (the difference was between 7 and 8% in 2006). What is unusual is that – according to the official statistics – the eco-

nomically active population is higher than that of urban dwellers. An overwhelming majority of the economically active rural populace is composed of people who had lost their job during the course of the regime change, and after moving out from an urban area to retire to their native village or dacha, started subsistence farming. This type of suburbanisation or deurbanisation is very typical of the east Ukrainian industrial regions (Donbas and Dnipro) and the adjoining rural areas. Thus, people in possession of a household plot sufficient for pursuing subsistence activities (and selling their surplus at the local market) have become active earners. This group is rather large and included a quarter of the rural population in the 2001 census.

An overwhelming majority of the economically active population are employees; their


number was 20.5 million in the age bracket of 15 to 70 year olds and 18.8 million within the country's working age population as a whole. Since 2000, there has been a positive shift as the number of employees has tended to stabilise. The same trend is visible in the rates of employment, which are approaching 58% for the age group of 15–70 years and 66% for the working age population (Figure 40).


A dramatic contraction in the number of employees occurred in the 1990s, as is clearly indicated by a halving in the number of payroll employees between 1990 and 2003. Though to a differing spatial extent, the related data displays a decline everywhere: more in the regions tradition-

ally associated with mining and heavy industry (Donets'k, Luhans'k and Kharkiv), and to a lesser degree in the less industrialised regions with a typically agricultural character (Figure 41).

Naturally, economic transformation has left its mark on the *employment structure*, but its impact was not as strong as in other post-Socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This is signalled by a high percentage of people employed in agriculture: 22% at the time of the 2001 census. Other statistical sources put this index lower at 13–14%, but even this figure is higher than in most of the transition countries (Figure 41).

Despite economic transformation having taken place, manufacturing, construction and





branches of mining have retained their dominance within the employment structure: nearly 30% of employees are occupied in the secondary sector. The slow progress of the tertiary sector in Ukraine is responsible for the relatively high percentage of employees working in production, although finance, real estate and business consulting have come to the fore of late.

According to data from the Labour Force Survey, a relatively delayed but rapid growth in *unemployment* started in Ukraine in the mid-1990s and reached its maximum in 1998, when the number of jobless was near to 3 million. Since then it has virtually halved, dropping to around 1.5 million by 2006. Over the same period the rate of unemployment decreased from 14% to ca. 7%. The data does not reveal significant differences between urban and rural unemployment; the former was just over 7% whereas the latter stayed somewhat above 6%. A notable situation has arisen where the higher level of economic activity in rural areas is coupled with a lower rate of unemployment.

A further characteristic feature of unemployment in Ukraine is the absence of any


identifiable groups that are particularly afflicted. The unemployment rate is roughly the same, amongst both males and females, and one cannot find an overrepresented age bracket.

A database established using ILO methodology is useful in revealing the volumes and structural characteristics of unemployment but fails in representing spatial disparities. However, the latter can be studied by using the available database of registered unemployed, broken down by raions. This would offer high spatial resolution, but the ambiguity of the database calls for caution. Due to strict regulations, only some of those seeking employment are registered as unemployed. It is very probable that the rate of unemployment reflected in this database (3–4%) does not reflect the true scale, but it surely does mirror spatial disparities.

According to data for 2007, the percentage of those registered as unemployed varied within a narrow margin between the regions of Ukraine, i.e. between 0.4 and 5.4%. Although these facts would seem to preclude a deep and detailed analysis of spatial inequalities, nevertheless some region specific features may be ap-

Fig. 42

SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT




parent. One of them is that the lowest figures for unemployment are typical of big cities (Odesa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and L'viv) and their surroundings, thus proving their importance in providing jobs. The national capital plays a significant role: Kyiv has an extensive zone of influence, emerging as an island amidst depressed rural areas in the mid-west of the country. Due to the aforementioned phenomena of counter-urbanisation under economic pressure, in rural areas with low income levels there is also a low rate of unemployment outside urban agglomerations, but adjoining them (west of Odesa, Kyiv Region, Donetsk Basin, wider environs of Vinnytsia and Khmel'nyts'kyi). The western borderlands are also in a favourable situation owing to several TNCs founding subsidiaries (and hence bringing jobs) to take advantage of transport links and the geographical proximity to the periphery of the EU, along with large eastern markets. There is also relatively low unemployment in the regions popular with tourists (Carpathians, Crimea).

Larger, contiguous territories with high unemployment are to be found far from the ma-

ior employment hubs, in areas within the 'labour market shadow'. Just such a semi-circle shaped area – characterised by a high rate of unemployment – is located between Donbas (Figure 42), the Kharkiv agglomeration and the industrial Dnipro Region. Unemployment is typically high in rural areas along the lower reaches of the Southern Buh and the Dnipro, in the forests of Polissia, Podillia and the Carpathians. Extremely high rates are recorded along the upper reaches of the Dnister (Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast: Horodenka; Chernivtsi oblast: Hertsa, Kel'mentsi), characterised by rural overpopulation and aggravated by the disadvantages of being a borderland territory (neighbouring the remotest and most backward areas of Romania and Moldova). Regions located in the labour market shadow are considered to be areas close to Transnistria in the southwest, tiny villages in Sumy oblast, along with northern, rural parts of Luhans'k oblast abutting the Russian Federation in the northeast.

Incomes of the population are fundamentally dependent on the local labour market, its opportunities for employment and rates of unemployment therefore it is not surprising that a close



relationship exists between the pattern of average income and unemployment. The maps representing the spatial correlation between these two indices are the inverse of one another (*Figure 43*).

There was a seven-fold difference between minimum and maximum average wages at a raion level in 2004, which is a particularly high figure. On the one hand only one quarter of mean incomes in the raions exceed the national average, whereas in contrast half of incomes fail to reach 75% of this average. Salaries that are higher than the average are typical of big cities and industrial centres, whereas extremely low wages are a characteristic of wide areas of rural Ukraine. However, the highest wages are not in Kyiv or in other big cities, rather they are found in the dormitory settlements near nuclear power plants such as Enerhodar, Kuznetsovs'k, Netishyn and Yuznoukrains'k, which are the "richest towns in the land". These are followed by minor seaports providing relief for Odesa: Pivdennyi (Yuzhne) and Illichivs'k. Incomes are very similar in Boryspil', near to the capital's

airport. Next is Kyiv and the settlements in its sphere of influence, along with medium-sized towns reliant on coal mining in the Donbas (Pershotravens'k, Vuhledar and Rovenki). Large industrial centres (Donets'k, Kramators'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, Mariupol' and Nikopol') rank next, with other areas above the average following behind, i.e. the urban areas of Galicia and Transcarpathia (L'viv, Uzhhorod and Mukacheve) having successfully attracted western investment, and the hubs of tourism along the Crimean coastline (e.g. Yalta).

The meagre average wage in the peripheral areas located west of Odesa is striking (Bolhrad and its environs) – where the multi-ethnic populace engages in rough grazing on the steppe as a means of subsistence – even amidst a background of low-paid rural areas in Podillia and Polissia. With regards to the average income, similar areas are to be found in the sparsely populated steppes of Crimea and Kherson oblast, and the densely populated upper reaches of the Dnister.